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Introduction 
In this thesis I will present the paradox of educating for autonomy, review 
some solutions to it, and finally argue in favour of a forward-looking solution to the 
paradox, whereby the paradox can be solved by considering a child’s right to an open 
future. 
In one sentence, the paradox of educating for autonomy consists in an 
apparent conflict between the means that are best suited for educating children—
roughly, the inculcation, by other people, of habits that bypass rationality, and the 
desired outcome of this process—an autonomous person. How can education truly 
promote the autonomy (to anticipate: the authenticity and rationality) of the child, 
while at the same time exerting on children a kind of influence that is not too far 
from manipulation?  
This is a work that spans different philosophical areas, such as the philosophy 
of education, the philosophy of childhood and value theory (in particular, 
philosophical debates on the nature and value of autonomy), and which necessarily 
has to rely on certain assumptions about the nature of children’s psychological 
development. However, the contribution I aim to make is purely philosophical and 
limited to the goal of providing a solution to the paradox.  
I will leave the discussion of the concept of autonomy to chapter 1, but here I 
will lay out two background assumptions I will not discuss further. The first 
assumption is that autonomy (whatever that exactly consists in) is something 
valuable, that is, something worth promoting and preserving. There can be 
disagreement about whether autonomy is an end in itself (separate from a person’s 
well-being), or a constitutive element of a person’s well-being, or again something 
merely instrumentally valuable (for example, valuable only as a means to promoting 
a person’s pleasure). But whatever view one prefers, the assumption here will be that 
promoting and preserving autonomy is a good thing.  
The second assumption is that promoting a person’s autonomy should, at 
least in principle, be one of the aims of education. Education for autonomy is 
believed to be liberating and providing a chance for children to escape the 
limitations set by their community that might hinder their life. It is often argued 
that such education will facilitate children with necessary skills to make well 
thought-out choices. At the same time education for autonomy is used as an antidote 
against parental, social and governmental manipulation that obstruct authenticity 
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of the child’s self, which (as seen in the next chapter) is a necessary condition for 
autonomy.  
By “education” here I will mean both formal education (by educational 
institutions such as schools) and informal education (such as is done, normally, by 
parents). Whenever the difference between formal and informal education is 
relevant, I will point that out. It is obvious that education should have some valuable 
goals in sight—education is not an end in itself, but is rather the means of a process 
of bringing about something valuable, most plausibly, something that contributes to 
the well-being both of the child and of the adult the child will become, as well as 
contributing to broader, social goals.  
Some might disagree with the assumption that promoting a person’s 
autonomy should be one of these goals—some might take the point of education to 
be exclusively promoting knowledge, or virtue, or sociality, but not autonomy. Such 
readers are therefore invited to read my thesis conditionally: if promoting autonomy 
should in principle be one goal of education, then there arises a paradox, but this 
paradox can be solved.1 Of course, those who think that the paradox cannot be solved 
may well take this as a reason to deny that promoting autonomy should be a goal of 
education: if educating for autonomy is impossible, then it is not true that children 
should be educated for autonomy. But in order to take the paradox seriously in the 
first place, one needs to at least take as prima facie desirable the idea of educating 
for autonomy. 
Here is an overview of my thesis. In the first chapter I will explain where 
exactly the conflict lies, relying on Richard Peters’s work. I will also explain why 
Peters’s own solution does not work (to anticipate: it does not solve the paradox with 
regards to authenticity). In the second chapter I will review Robert Noggle’s and 
Stefaan Cuypers’s solutions. The choice of these authors is motivated, in case of 
Peters, by the obvious fact that he formulated the paradox, and in the case of Noggle 
and Cuypers, by the fact that they propose explicit solutions to the paradox (Cuypers 
                                                   
1 Authors defending in detail the idea that autonomy should be one of the aims of education 
are Brighouse 2006, de Ruyter 2004 and White 2011. John White sees human flourishing as a life 
filled with autonomous, wholehearted and successful pursuits of worthwhile activities (2011). 
Whereas Harry Brighouse defines flourishing life as a life with two features: a worthwhile life that 
contains objective goods; and agents’ identification with the pursuit of those goods in the life they 
are leading (2006 p. 16). In a similar vein, Doret J. De Ruyter considers human flourishing to consist 
of “generic goods that are objectively identifiable and the meaningful interpretation of these goods 
by the person herself” (2004 p. 384). 
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is also the one author who engages with both Peters’s and Noggle’s work, so in a 
sense the very existence of this debate is owed to Cuypers). In other words, these 
three authors constitute the best existing literature up to now concerning the 
paradox. I will argue that each of these solutions is problematic in one way or 
another. In the third chapter I present my own solution, which is similar in spirit to 
Cuypers’s, but builds on Joel Feinberg’s notion of a child’s right to an open future. 
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Chapter 1 
What is the Paradox of Educating for Autonomy? 
1.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter will be to lay out the required background and 
introduce the paradox of educating for autonomy. In section 1.2, I will provide a 
brief introduction to the concept of autonomy and how external and internal forces 
can hinder one's autonomy. In what follows I will look at competency and 
authenticity conditions of autonomy, which will help later to explain the paradox. 
Section 1.3 will focus on defining the paradox of educating for autonomy which 
consists in incompatibility of means (education) and the end (autonomous person). 
I will present Richard S. Peters’s formulation of the paradox of moral education, 
which will serve as a starting point for explaining the paradox of educating for 
autonomy. Finally, in section 1.4, I will analyse Peters’s solution of the paradox of 
moral education. The discussion will reveal that the paradox of educating for 
autonomy lies in the authenticity condition of autonomy.  
1.2 What is autonomy? 
Looking at the preliminary definition of autonomy may be a useful start. 
Etymologically, autonomy means “self-rule” and originally it was applied to 
independent city-states. Later, the notion of autonomy was extended to also define 
an independent and free-thinking individual who has the right type of control while 
making decisions for herself (Cuypers & Haji 2006 p. 723).  
What does it mean to have the right type of control? While various accounts 
of control conditions have been proposed, this is not the place to assess these 
accounts. So, I only consider the general outlines that are widely accepted among 
different theories of autonomy. One necessary condition for having the right type of 
control is to be free from external forces like coercion or social pressure. A person 
who decides to surrender her money under a gun threat has not made an 
autonomous decision, or has not exercised her autonomy. However, an autonomous 
individual must not only be free from external forces but also from internal, 
psychological forces that can usurp control from the person. Examples of lack of 
internal control can include addictions or obsessive-compulsive disorders. 
Moreover, a person acting on desires that are the result of brainwashing may fail to 
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be autonomous—or at least, if we think of autonomy as coming in degrees, such a 
person will be to that extent less autonomous than a person who has not been 
brainwashed. A fictional illustration of the case can be seen in B.F. Skinner’s utopian 
novel Walden Two, where people of the community can choose anything they like; 
however, they have been conditioned since childhood to want and choose only what 
they can have or do (Skinner 1969). The reason why the internal control of people 
living in this utopia is undermined is because such conditioned desires or beliefs do 
not reflect who they really are and are, in a sense, “alien” to these people. These 
elements and their output as behaviour are inauthentic, because they are not a 
product of the real self.  
In what follows, I will assume that the type of internal control that is 
necessary for autonomy requires meeting two kinds of conditions: competency 
conditions and authenticity conditions (Christman 2018).2 A person satisfies 
competency conditions when she possesses (and exercises) capacities like rational 
deliberation, logical (in a broad sense) thinking, and self-evaluation. These 
capacities indicate whether the concerned person can function adequately while 
making choices or judging a given situation. Additionally, such conditions require 
that the person is free from debilitating pathologies that affect their decision-
making functionality.  
Authenticity conditions, on the other hand, require that the beliefs, desires, 
emotions or other psychological elements that make a person act in the way she does 
should be “her own”. In other words, if competency is a matter of possessing and 
exercising certain capacities, authenticity has to do with how a person has come to 
acquire the beliefs, desires etc., which guide the exercise of those capacities. To go 
back to the case of brainwashing: a brainwashed person might well exercise 
capacities of rational deliberation in selecting the optimal means to achieve her goal 
(say, effectively saving money, and expertly comparing different offers, in order to 
purchase an expensive car she desires). But if having that goal is purely the result of 
brainwashing, that goal is not in the relevant sense “her own”, and to that extent her 
choice will then be less autonomous (if autonomous at all). It is a controversial 
question, to which I come back in chapter 2, which kinds of processes of acquisition 
preserve or instead undermine authenticity. However, for now, it can be said that 
                                                   
2 These two conditions are those that I need in order to explain the paradox. I will leave it 
open whether also other conditions are necessary for autonomy.  
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authenticity is concerned with being true to oneself and, as Bialystok puts it, “[it is 
a] relationship of correspondence: it evinces an overlap between some aspect of 
one’s behavior or choices and one or more aspects of who one “really” is” (2017 p. 
4). 
1.3 The Paradox 
In what follows, then, educating for autonomy will be understood as educating the 
child with the goal of promoting her (and her adult self’s) competency and 
authenticity in the choices she makes (and will make). Why should educating for 
autonomy (so understood) be paradoxical? In general, we take education to be a 
process which, if “all goes well”, results in the acquisition of certain skills, capacities, 
traits. For example, there is nothing paradoxical in the idea of educating for sports 
or mathematical skills, even though of course it is not guaranteed that the pupil will 
in fact acquire sports or mathematical skills. Education is a fallible process. But the 
concept of a paradox of educating for autonomy points to something intrinsically 
wrong or misguided with including autonomy as an aim of education. In this case 
education is not only not guaranteed to succeed in its goal: it is guaranteed to fail.  
The paradox consists in a conflict between the desired outcome of education 
for autonomy—the development of a person who possesses (sufficient) competency 
and authenticity in her decision-making—and the means or methods used in the 
educational process. Education of a child requires mechanisms of habituation, 
which bypass the child’s rational capacities (thus undermining competency), and 
the inevitable influence on the child by adults and their aims (parents, teachers, 
etc.), thus making it seem impossible how the child’s acquired beliefs, desires etc. 
can be truly her own (hence undermining authenticity). To use an analogy: the 
project of educating for autonomy would seem to be as paradoxical as the idea of 
curing a disease by administering a poison that aggravates that very same disease.3 
My formulation of the paradox consists in a slight modification of what Peters 
called the paradox of moral education: 
What then is the paradox of moral education as I conceive it? It is this: given that it is desirable 
to develop people who conduct themselves rationally, intelligently and with a fair degree of 
                                                   
3 It follows from the paradox that, if and when a person becomes autonomous, she does so 
despite having been educated, or, if there is some positive correlation between education and the 
development of autonomy, we shouldn’t see the latter as the result of the former. Education might 
still be the stimulus to other factors which favour the development of autonomy. 
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spontaneity, the brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative years of a 
child’s development he is incapable of this form of life and impervious to the proper manner 
of passing it on. [...] Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that a rational code of behaviour [...] is 
beyond the grasp of young children, they can and must enter the palace of Reason through the 
courtyard of Habit and Tradition. [....] The problem of moral education is that of how the 
necessary habits of behaviour […] can be acquired in a way which does not stultify the 
development of a rational code […] at a later stage (1981 pp. 51–2). 
As the passage makes clear, Peters’s emphasis is not on the development of 
autonomy per se, but on morality. However, the problems that Peters sees in 
educating children for morality are exactly applicable to educating children for 
autonomy. In fact, it can be said that Peters sees a paradox in educating for morality 
because he (1) sees a paradox in educating for autonomy and (2) takes autonomy as 
a constitutive feature of a moral agent (an agent who can form and act according to 
a moral code)—a non-autonomous agent cannot be a moral agent. In this sense, 
then, the paradox of educating for autonomy is the more fundamental one. 
Peters explains the problem: children need to enter the “palace of Reason”—
in this context, really another word for “autonomy”—but, given the “brute facts of 
child development”, they can only do so through the two forces of “Habit and 
Tradition”. First, habit refers to activities to which children are trained in ways that 
are not rational. According to Peters, appealing to reason, i.e. to the exercise of 
rational capacities, is not really an option while educating children (1981 p. 52). He 
draws such a conclusion from the works of psychologists like Piaget and Luria who 
claimed that, for children up to a certain age, giving reasons for rules has very little 
effect, as rules appear to a child as something external and unalterable. Nor can 
often children understand the long-term benefits or harms of different activities. 
This is the sense in which education cannot but largely bypass rationality, and thus 
seems to conflict with the promotion of competency conditions of autonomy. 
Second, tradition refers to a set of concepts, notions, ideas which belong to adults, 
and which adults then go on to impart on and transmit to the child. Peters here 
makes use of Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between “languages” and “literature” 
(Oakeshott 1962 p. 309). A “language” is a way of reasoning or thinking. In contrast, 
“literature” is something that has been authoritatively said in a given language (1962 
p. 309). For example, a textbook of chemistry is the “literature” of the scientific field 
as it teaches how to use the products of scientific thought; whereas, the “language” 
is the way scientists think and recognise a scientific problem or proposition (1962 p. 
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310). The point of education for autonomy thus would be to initiate the child into 
the “language” of autonomy (Gardner 1981 p. 69; Oliver 1985 p. 16). However, this 
can be done only by passing down a “literature” that obviously does not belong to 
the child. If relying on tradition is a necessary element of education, as Peters holds, 
then this seems to undermine the authenticity of the beliefs and values acquired by 
the child during the educational process. In one sentence: through the methods of 
habit and tradition, one can learn (for example) to “speak chemistry”, but one 
cannot likewise learn to “speak autonomy” (and in turn, cannot learn to “speak 
morality”, for Peters). In this sense, educating for autonomy seems a contradiction 
in terms. 
1.4 Peters’s solution and its problem  
Having pointed out the paradox, Peters goes on to argue that it can be solved. 
I will present his solution and criticize it. Seeing what is problematic with Peters’s 
solution will be a step forward towards more plausible solutions. Peters calls 
attention to two kinds of habits: On the one hand, we have passive habits that 
exclude intelligent adaptability.4 Such habits are those that we have in mind when 
using phrases like “out of habit” or “that is a matter of sheer habit”. On the other 
hand, we have active habits that are adaptable to various purposes (1981 pp. 55–7). 
In general, we use the notion of a habit to characterize and explain certain kinds of 
actions. Taking off my shoes as soon as I enter home is a habitual action of mine; I 
take off my shoes because I have the habit of doing so. As this example shows, in 
principle people can have reasons for their habitual actions—if asked why I take off 
my shoes, I can answer “to avoid dirtying the floor.” However, what is distinctive of 
habitual actions is that they are done in an automatic way, because they have been 
done many times before and will be repeated again. What Peters points out is that 
this automaticity of habits is compatible with a certain degree of open-endedness 
and adaptability to different circumstances. In one word, habits can be intelligent, 
and in this sense, active. When applied to the context of rules and codes of conduct 
(which, as seen above, is Peters’s explicit focus), the distinction between active and 
                                                   
4 Peters does not actually use the terms "active" and "passive" when talking about habits. I 
employ these terms to make the distinction clearer and easier to understand. Throughout the rest of 
this thesis, I will be using these terms as though Peters himself used them. 
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passive habits corresponds to the distinction between acting on a rule (where the 
agent sees, or at least can see, the point of the rule) and acting simply in accordance 
with a rule (where the agent follows the rule simply because of drilling or 
conformism). Acting on a rule presupposes acting in the light of a generally 
conceived end, that is served by following the rule (Peters 1981 p. 56). For example, 
taking off one’s shoes after entering home is a rule that can be seen to serve a general 
end (keeping the house clean), and not be just something that you do because “that’s 
what people do” or as a blind reflex. According to Peters, then, inculcating habits 
through tradition does not necessarily conflict with promoting autonomy, because 
the habits formed through education can be active, intelligent habits (1981 p. 57). In 
this case, the agent is in a position to think rationally about what they do 
(competency) and, because she understands the complexity of a given concept or 
rule, she is not simply using the “literature” of the concept, but she can creatively 
and intelligently practice the “language” for herself, thus making the rule an 
authentic element of herself. In other words, with active habits the agent can gain 
the right type of control that is necessary for autonomy.  
However, there is a major flaw in Peters’s solution. Even though the 
development of active habits may to some extent promote autonomy, it will do so 
only if active habits are authentic elements of the self. However, nothing that Peters 
says ensures that active habits will be more authentic—more the agent’s “own”—
than her passive habits. For all he says, active habits will still be the result of the 
inculcation, by others, of a certain “literature”, upon the child. Here is an 
illustration. A religiously educated person might well express her commitment to 
religious doctrines (in particular here, moral doctrines based on religion) as an 
active habit: instead of blindly following what priests or a sacred book tell her to do, 
she is able to question and defend her religious convictions, as well as adapt those 
rules to new situations. She has gained competency. However, she has inculcated 
those doctrines since a very early age. The process of acquisition has been 
completely shaped by the wishes of others (parents, schools etc.). There is going to 
be a question, if and to what extent the religious commitments she expresses can 
really be said to be her own. For all we know, such commitments have been simply 
passed down e.g. from her parents to her (and for that matter, likely from her 
grandparents to her parents, and so on). So her religiosity may still be an inauthentic 
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part of herself, despite her competency. If so, the paradox is not solved by active 
habits. 
In a relevant discussion, Harvey Siegel proposes that by educating the child 
to cultivate a habit of rational evaluation of habits themselves, the child herself will 
be able to evaluate the recommended habit as being worthy, thereby becoming 
autonomous with respect to such a habit (Siegel 1988). This suggestion can be taken 
to indirectly lend support to Peters’s solution. In Siegel’s view, which also dovetails 
with Peters’s conception of an autonomous person, critical thinking and education 
for autonomy are closely related. Since a rational person is capable of judging and/or 
justifying her beliefs and her values, a rational person is also an autonomous person 
(Siegel 1988 pp. 86–7). The idea then is that the habit of rational reflection will serve 
as a mechanism to cleanse any inauthentic element of the self (Siegel 1988 pp. 86–
7). 
The problem with this suggestion is that a habit of rational reflection can be 
itself an inauthentic element of the self. Clearly one can be indoctrinated into this 
habit as into any other (active or passive) habit. A good historical example of this is 
John Stuart Mill's autobiographical reflections on the strictly rationalistic education 
he had received from his father and from the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy 
Bentham (Mill 1874). What Mill laments is that his habit of rational reflection, 
valuable as it was, was at some point perceived as alien to himself: it was instilled in 
him from an early age, eventually leading up to a period of depression. The deep 
dissatisfaction he felt was a sign that he was not at one with the belief and values 
that he had been taught (including his commitment to utilitarianism), and with the 
habits he had been trained for, no matter how much of an expert he had become in 
rational (self-)evaluation. What was lacking is that such traits, including the habit 
of rational reflection, were not authentic elements of his self. Therefore, Siegel’s 
suggestion does not help Peters’s solution.  
Peters’s account explains how certain habits can be autonomy-supporting 
after a person has acquired a set of beliefs and values that can be said to be 
authentic. But the paradox of educating for autonomy remains: Peters has not 
explained how one can acquire, through education, beliefs and values that are 
authentic. For all we know, the educative process, even when it promotes habits of 
rational (self-)scrutiny, still produces agents whose central beliefs, desires, 
dispositions to act are as inauthentic as the beliefs, desires etc., of agents who have 
 
11 
 
not been trained for rational reflection. So, the educational process is still 
incompatible with the promotion of autonomy.  
As this discussion makes clear, the factor which makes the paradox of 
educating for autonomy persist is the authenticity condition for autonomy. Until 
and unless one’s “evaluative scheme” (to use an expression in Cuypers 2009) has 
been acquired in such a way that it can be said to be truly one’s own, the person’s 
autonomy will not be promoted and is rather undermined by the educative process.5 
Note that I am not claiming that authenticity is in general impossible. What I am 
claiming is that there is a conflict in principle between the methods of education and 
the development of authentic elements of the self. People can become authentic, and 
thus autonomous: but not thanks to education.  
In this chapter, we saw an overview of the conception of autonomy, and 
discussed competency and authenticity requirements. Next, I discussed Peters’s 
definition and solution to the paradox of moral education. I have argued that the 
paradox of educating for autonomy arises because promoting/preserving a child’s 
autonomy seems incompatible with the nature of education. Finally, I have 
concluded that although Peters gives valuable insights on how habits (autonomic 
actions) do not necessarily preclude a person’s autonomy (compatible with 
competency), it does not explain how education is compatible with preserving the 
authenticity.  
 
  
                                                   
5 “Evaluative scheme” is a person’s “self” which is constructed around certain core beliefs 
and desires that constitute the agent’s most basic, important and—not necessarily consciously 
chosen—principles and convictions, together with her long-term goals and commitments and values 
(Cuypers 2009 p. 130).  
 
12 
 
Chapter 2 
Two solutions of the paradox 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I will review the solutions to the paradox proposed by Robert 
Noggle and Stefaan E. Cuypers. This chapter will be structured as follows: in section 
2.2, I will describe in detail Noggle’s suggestion that any initial self should be 
regarded as authentic, and in section 2.3, I will argue that Noggle takes authenticity 
to be too loose, which will result in attributing authenticity to inauthentic choices. 
Then in section 2.4 I will turn my attention to Cuypers’s proposal that views 
authenticity in a forward looking manner, claiming that attitudes (desires, beliefs, 
etc.,) instilled during childhood is autonomy-preserving as long as they do not 
undermine future moral responsibilities. In section 2.5, I will argue that tying 
educating for autonomy to educating for moral responsibility is too strict and does 
not solve the paradox. Because educating for moral responsibility encourages moral 
life and character as the only life option for an autonomous person, which 
contradicts the very purpose of education for autonomy. 
2.2 Noggle’s solution: against the ab initio requirement 
Noggle has argued that the paradox arises only because of an inflated, and in 
fact contradictory, notion of what it takes to be authentic. Instead, he proposes that 
the psychological elements of the “initial” self should be already regarded as 
authentic (2005 pp. 100–3). In this sense, then, there is no problem with 
authenticity in the first place. What will be important is simply to ensure that 
education preserves this already given authenticity. And an education which fosters 
rational reflection and critical thinking can do exactly that.  
Noggle starts out arguing that we should reject what he calls the “ab initio 
requirement” for authenticity. The ab initio requirement is the notion that an 
element of the self can only be authentic if it derives from another authentic element. 
In other words, inauthentic elements cannot pass authenticity on to another 
element. Imposing such a requirement means that we are essentially “stuck” with 
inauthentic selves: unless the initial elements of our self are themselves authentic, 
there is no way we can become authentic. But, if the requirement holds, then how 
can the initial elements be themselves authentic? The only remaining possibility is 
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that the initial elements somehow give authenticity to themselves. But this, argues 
Noggle, “requires a self-creating self that could never exist”. A self-creating self 
would be a kind of entity that both: 
a) exists, as it is going to create something, and  
b) does not exist, which must be true in order for the “self-creating self” to be 
created (Noggle 2005 p. 96). 
Hence, the notion of a self-creating self is a conceptual impossibility. Even if it were 
possible, say, that a God-like creature that has such a capacity, it clearly would not 
be possible for human beings. In other words, the ab initio requirement on 
authenticity either makes it impossible to be authentic, or requires the contradictory 
idea of a self-creating self. Since both options are unacceptable, Noggle argues we 
should reject the ab initio requirement. 
Now, we can see that if the ab initio requirement holds, there would be no 
way out of the paradox of educating for autonomy. If, as the requirement says, an 
authentic self cannot grow out of an inauthentic self, then the job of education 
simply cannot be to promote authenticity and in turn autonomy, because education 
operates upon a self that, for all we know, is not authentic (because there cannot be 
a self-created self), and education itself contributes to adding inauthentic elements.  
Luckily, as Noggle has argued, we should reject the ab initio requirement. 
Once we reject that requirement, how should we think of authenticity?  
On the one hand, Noggle suggests that an authentic self can be the result of a 
gradual process. Over time, we develop a relatively stable, orderly belief system and 
preference structure: these are our “core attitudes” (Noggle 2005 p. 99). Over time, 
we also acquire deliberative capacities to reflect upon and revise those beliefs and 
preferences. In particular, we can adjust our “peripheral” attitudes (desires or 
beliefs), in the light of new information.6 For example, we may acquire a preference 
for healthier food, when we become aware of its benefits. Or, for a typical childhood 
example of such a revision process, we may abandon our belief in Santa Claus, when 
we realize that it is our parents who bring the presents.  
However, changes to core attitudes do not occur quite often and not as easy 
as to peripheral attitudes. Changes to core attitudes are usually motivated by an 
internal need to resolve possible contradictions or tensions within our evaluative 
                                                   
6 Peripheral attitudes are relatively flexible attitudes that can rapidly change in the light of 
new information. These attitudes are not essential for the stability of evaluative schemes.  
 
14 
 
scheme. A dramatic example would be a person abandoning her belief in God in 
response, for example, to recognition of the amount of suffering in the world. But 
“change” doesn’t necessarily mean abandoning beliefs/desires or acquiring new 
ones. It can also mean adopting the same ones on a new basis. This is what Mill did: 
after his depression, he renewed his commitment to utilitarianism, having now 
found a basis for it in his own experience of life. In such an evolution of core 
attitudes, Noggle argues that the self evolves “according to its own internal logic” 
(2005 p. 100). Such changes can therefore be considered to be authenticity-
preserving, as the new (or renewed) element of the self (a belief, a preference, etc.) 
is an authentic continuation of the previous elements, regardless of whether these 
elements were already authentic themselves. In contrast, a change that did not occur 
in the same way, i.e. not as an internally motivated continuation of a previous 
configuration, cannot count as authenticity-preserving. For example, sudden 
organic traumas, or nefarious brain surgeries, might fall into this category.   
Noggle sums up the development of an authentic self this way: “Out of a 
seemingly unpromising beginning—a sort of chaotic psychological “soup”—the 
child's [initial] self gradually emerges as her cognitive and motivational systems 
develop the kind of structure and stability and the rational and reflective capacities 
necessary for the existence of a coherent and stable self that can be the source of 
authenticity” (Noggle 2005, p. 101). 
However, what about people who do not go through such changes? Do their 
beliefs and desires never get to be authentic? This is where Noggle in effect 
neutralizes the very problem of authenticity in the first place. Once a self is fully 
formed (has acquired a set of core attitudes), and there is no “previous self” on top 
of which one can arise, Noggle argues that this self must be declared authentic—even 
if this initial self is the result of standard child-rearing techniques based on sheer 
indoctrination. He gives the examples of “Edgar the evil”7 and “oppressed Olivia”8 
and writes that: 
                                                   
7 Edgar the evil “is the son of a crime boss who rears him to follow in his footsteps. Using 
standard child-rearing techniques, he encourages Edgar’s more selfish and violent impulses and 
discourages empathy and compassion. As Edgar reaches adulthood, he is quite thoroughly evil” 
(Noggle 2005 p. 102).  
8 Oppressed Olivia “has been raised (using standard child-rearing techniques) to abide by 
and adopt the sexist attitudes of the patriarchal society in which she lives. Consequently, she shapes 
her ideals, aspirations, and activities in ways that reflect these attitudes. As Olivia reaches adult- 
hood, her convictions include a belief in the naturalness of women’s subservient role, and her deepest 
aspiration is to be a housewife” (Noggle 2005 p. 102). 
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The only real difference between them and us is that we were brainwashed into having less 
dysfunctional attitudes (or if not, then we have at least been better able to leave ours behind). 
We must keep in mind that acknowledging that these attitudes are authentic (to Olivia and 
Edgar) does not require us to abandon our moral outrage at the fact that they have warped, 
corrupted, and stifled the development of these two people. We simply need to articulate that 
outrage a bit more carefully. It is not that the earliest socialization of a child into an evil or 
oppressive worldview imprisons some better self (Noggle 2005 p. 104).  
Since there is no other self that has emerged from such childhood, any 
possible other self does not exist for Edgar and Olivia. Noggle adds that it is 
unfortunate that the self of a child might be morally and in other ways defective. 
However, as the authenticity of a self is about what beliefs and desires are truly a 
person’s own, then that is no reason to claim that these initial desires and beliefs do 
not belong to the self. In other words, there is a big difference between the 
application of brainwashing and related techniques to a person with a fully-formed 
self, and the application of very similar techniques during the early stages of child 
rearing. In both cases, we create a self. But in the former case, we create a self by 
destroying an already existing one, and the new self will be inauthentic. In the latter 
case, we create the only self a person can ever have been until that point, and for this 
reason this self can be her only authentic self.  
Noggle’s solution to the paradox of educating for autonomy therefore looks 
as follows. When education contributes to forming the initial self (typically, parental 
education), then education (like brainwashing in the case of Edgar and Olivia) 
contributes to forming a self that must be declared authentic. When education 
contributes to reshaping an already existing formed self (for example, through 
schooling), then education can be authenticity-preserving, as long as education 
helps to satisfy an internal need to resolve contradictions or tensions within our 
evaluative scheme.9 In both cases, education would turn out to be compatible with 
the formation of an authentic, and in turn, autonomous self.  
2.3 The problem with Noggle’s view  
I agree with Noggle that the self-creating self is impossible, and thus that the 
ab initio requirement for authenticity should be rejected. We need to understand 
                                                   
9 Of course schooling and other educational systems can still undermine the person’s 
authenticity. A solution to the paradox however only requires that education be compatible with 
promoting authenticity—that there be no in principle conflict. 
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authenticity (and in turn autonomy) as a work in progress, rather than postulate a 
special authenticity-conferring act that lies at the bottom of the “authenticity chain”. 
However, I cannot agree with Noggle’s idea that the initial self should be declared to 
be authentic, in the sense of authenticity that is relevant to the promotion of the 
agent’s autonomy. In other words: the combination of competency conditions 
(assuming they are acquired somewhat later in life) plus Noggle’s “initial self 
authenticity” does not result in the autonomy of the person later in life. Here is why.  
Consider again Oppressed Olivia. Her parents have successfully managed to 
implant into her a desire for submissiveness that is, in Alfred Mele’s phrase, 
“practically non-sheddable” for her. An element of psychology (a desire, a belief, 
etc.) is practically non-sheddable for an individual if resisting that element is not a 
“psychologically genuine option” for her (Mele 2001 p. 172). This means that Olivia 
cannot reason her way to the rejection of, or even to resistance against, her desire 
for submissiveness. Her desire can change only upon some brain trauma or perhaps 
via coerced psychotherapy. I say “coerced”, because she cannot herself decide to 
start such a therapy: that would require a degree of control over her desire which by 
assumption she lacks. When Olivia grows up, since she cannot resist the implanted 
desire, her only psychologically genuine option is to live a submissive life. Now, on 
Noggle’s account, since all the elements of Olivia’s initial self must be authentic—
including her desire to be submissive—therefore also her “choice” to live a 
submissive life will be authentic and thus autonomous. But this seems 
counterintuitive. Olivia does not have sufficient internal control of her life. Nor does 
she really have other options but to satisfy her desire to be submissive. She therefore 
cannot be autonomous, and in turn, this means we should not declare by default all 
initial elements of a self to be authentic, in the sense of “authentic” that matters for 
autonomy.  
Olivia’s initial self is indeed the only self she can have up to that point, but 
this is not enough to call it “authentic”. Authenticity (as a condition for autonomy) 
cannot be equated with “being there from the beginning”. People’s initial selves (that 
is, their initial core attitudes) cannot really be called either authentic or inauthentic, 
but rather “non-authentic”. The question of their authenticity can only be addressed 
once the person is in a position to relate to them. It is this relation to oneself which 
will determine the (in)authenticity of her attitudes, whether and which ones are 
truly her own. Noggle’s view, instead, is reminiscent of an outdated conception of 
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childhood, in which the child is seen as an empty canvas to be painted into whatever 
composition the artist (typically, the parent) wants. Any shape that the artist will 
paint Olivia into, will be authentic. Yet children are not empty canvases. They are 
potential agents who can grow up to execute their own will. This is the problem: to 
the extent that we stir values that we deem right into children, we form their initial 
self while at the same time inevitably constraining the development of their own 
agency. Think about terrorist camps where they take children at a very young age 
and manipulate them to only see their community’s own truth. If nothing occurs in 
between, these children will be executing the will of their commander, which means 
that they will not be the force of their own actions. Far from expressing their 
authentic self, they will have lost even their potential for authenticity. In other 
words, the paradox of educating for autonomy cannot be solved by claiming that 
initial selves are already authentic.  
2.4 Cuypers’s solution: moral responsibility and authenticity 
Cuypers attempts to solve the paradox of educating for autonomy in two steps 
(2009). Firstly, Cuypers assumes that educating children to become moral agents is 
the primary aim of education. Accordingly, being a moral agent means to be an agent 
who can shoulder moral responsibility for her actions. Secondly, educating for 
becoming morally responsible agents will necessarily include educating for 
becoming authentic agents, because Cuypers (as I explain below) sees authenticity 
as a necessary condition for responsibility: there is no responsibility (for a certain 
action) without authenticity (relative to that action). So one cannot educate for 
moral responsibility unless one can also educate for authenticity. From this 
reasoning, it immediately follows that, if educating for moral responsibility is 
possible, then also educating for authenticity is possible. And since presumably 
educating for responsibility is possible, the conclusion follows that educating for 
authenticity must be possible, too. And if educating for authenticity is possible, then 
educating for autonomy is possible. Hence the paradox is solved, or perhaps better, 
avoided altogether, once we see authenticity as, so to speak, in the same package 
with moral responsibility.10  
                                                   
10 Of course a critic might immediately reply that another reasoning is possible here: if, as 
Cuypers thinks, responsibility includes authenticity, and educating for authenticity is impossible, 
then also educating for responsibility is impossible. The paradox of educating for autonomy, instead 
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In Cuypers’s analysis (2009 p. 135), an agent S is not morally responsible for 
a particular action A, unless: (i) S knows that S is doing wrong (or right) in doing A; 
(ii) S has a responsibility-relevant control in performing A; and (iii) A stems from 
psychological elements that are components of S’s authentic evaluative scheme. 
Clause (iii) makes authenticity a necessary condition for moral responsibility of an 
agent. For example, I am not morally responsible for hitting an innocent person, 
unless (i) I know that in this way I am doing something wrong, (ii) I had sufficient 
control in hitting her (in other words, I had sufficient control to decide not to hit 
her), and (iii) my action stemmed from psychological elements that are components 
of my authentic evaluative scheme. Since this is a logical conjunction, and each of 
the three conjuncts is necessary for moral responsibility, it follows that if hitting an 
innocent person was not a result of authentic psychological elements of myself, then 
I am not morally responsible for my action (though I can be legally responsible). 
And if I am morally responsible for my action, then it must be true that some 
authentic psychological element of myself was behind my action (say, I have an 
ingrained tendency to be aggressive). 
Notice that Cuypers does not give us any analysis of authenticity as such. He 
instead relies on whatever specific analysis of authenticity works best. His point is 
simply that I cannot be morally responsible for my action unless the action was 
connected to a desire, habit etc., that is truly my own. This might seem 
disappointing, given the centrality that the concept of authenticity has in this thesis. 
Nonetheless, Cuypers’s strategy to solve the paradox is clear, and can still be 
assessed as such. Moreover, even if Cuypers does not offer an analysis of authenticity 
as such, he offers what he calls a “criterion for authenticity”, which relies on the 
connection with responsibility just noted:  
A child’s initial evaluative scheme is responsibility-wise authentic if its doxastic and pro‐
attitudinal elements11 (i) include all those, if any, that are required to ensure that the agent 
(into whom the child will develop) will be morally responsible for its future behavior; (ii) do 
not include any that will subvert the agent’s being responsible for future behavior that issues 
                                                   
of being avoided, in fact spreads out to become the paradox of educating for responsibility. But I will 
not consider this reply here. 
11 Doxastic elements are beliefs about matters of fact. Pro-attitudinal elements are desires, 
preferences, commitments, values held by the person. 
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from these elements; and (iii) have been acquired by means that, again, will not subvert the 
agent’s being responsible for its future behavior (2009 pp.138-9). 
These three conditions are, of course, already implicit in the idea that authenticity 
is necessary to responsibility: since authentic beliefs and desires are among the 
elements from which moral responsibility is built up, then educating the child for 
authenticity requires educating him in ways and with methods which promote and 
do not subvert his moral responsibility as an adult. In other words, if the child’s 
authenticity is neglected in her education, her future moral responsibility is 
threatened too.12 An example can be inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile 
(1763). One way to subvert Emile’s future moral responsibility by making him 
inauthentic can be (perhaps paradoxically) by instilling in him a desire to always act 
in moral perfect ways, that is by educating him to be a moral saint (to use Susan 
Wolf’s notion in (Wolf 1982)). Because such a desire will dominate his decisions—
he will not ever stop to think whether anything else matters except doing the right 
thing—Emile’s actions will be lacking in authenticity, and as a result Emile will not 
be morally responsible for performing those actions, no matter how worthy they 
might be. Emile has been shaped into a machine of moral perfection, but a machine 
cannot be responsible.  
 Cuypers’s solution to the paradox therefore makes use of a presumed 
necessary connection between future moral responsibility and authenticity. It can 
be called a forward-looking solution to the paradox, since the possibility of 
promoting authenticity (and thus autonomy) through education of the child is 
staked on the role that authenticity must play in the child’s future, in particular, as 
regards his future moral responsibility. In other words, authenticity is not a 
backward-looking feature, such that an element is authentic only if derives from a 
prior authentic element (as in those views that endorse the ab initio requirement), 
nor does Cuypers need to assume authenticity as a given feature, such that any agent 
by default initially possesses it (as in Noggle’s view).  
                                                   
12 Note that authenticity alone does not guarantee moral responsibility, because the other 
two conditions must also be present: knowledge of right and wrong, and the control condition. 
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2.5 The problem with Cuypers’s solution 
Here I argue that Cuypers’s account, being based on the connection between 
authenticity and future moral responsibility, must require a kind of education that 
will only aim at forming a specific kind of agent. This does not, perhaps, contradict 
the notion of an ideal autonomous person, but it contradicts the very project of 
educating for autonomy. 
To be a morally responsible agent, on Cuypers’s account, implies that the 
person has a “thick” form of rationality (2009 p. 135).13 As Marina Oshana puts it, a 
thick form of rationality “embodies a normative component and is a matter of 
satisfying criteria that are objective in the sense that they are independent of what a 
person happens to want or to value” (Oshana 2002 p. 262). Cuypers’s morally 
responsible agent must possess thick rationality, insofar as she must satisfy the first 
condition for responsibility: she must be able to tell whether what she did was wrong 
or right, otherwise she is not responsible for her action. In other words, she needs 
to possess moral knowledge at least relative to the action for which we ascribe her 
responsibility.  
But if educating for authenticity (and thus for autonomy) is only understood 
as part of the project of educating a child to become a morally responsible agent, 
then educating for autonomy must pay its respects to ensuring or at least not 
undermining the first condition for moral responsibility (as well as to any other 
condition). That is, educating for autonomy must be overall coherent with imparting 
her objective moral knowledge (or in Oshana’s terms, promoting her “thick 
rationality”). And herein lies a tension.  
In order to be autonomous, one does not need thick rationality, that is, one 
does not need to possess objective moral knowledge. Or at least, to acquire moral 
knowledge would be a very controversial demand to make on autonomous people as 
such. In deciding how to live her life, a person might decide to live a fully 
autonomous life while remaining indifferent to moral principles. Gaining moral 
knowledge and living by it is one of the options for autonomous agents: but morality 
does not enjoy any special as such. An autonomous agent might as well devote 
                                                   
13 Cuypers does not use the word “thick rationality” to describe moral knowledge that he 
thinks needed for moral responsibility. I borrow the term “thick rationality” from Marina Oshana as 
it helps to explain Cuypers account clearer.  
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herself entirely to non-moral ends, like art, or accumulating money, or maximizing 
one’s own pleasure.  
Notice that the problem is not with inculcating moral knowledge per se. This 
can be in itself a worthy aim of education. The problem is that, on Cuypers’s account, 
educating for authenticity (and hence for autonomy) must itself include inculcating 
moral knowledge—since authenticity is regarded only in relation to moral 
responsibility, and moral knowledge is a necessary condition for moral 
responsibility. In other words, for Cuypers, a form of education that disregards 
inculcating moral knowledge would be defective as a form of education for 
autonomy. But this is unacceptable, because when educating for autonomy, it seems 
one should not aim to inculcate any particular normative system, including 
morality. The result of “Cuypersian” education for autonomy would be an agent who 
reasons in a specific, constrained, way, rather than an agent free to explore various 
possibilities for her life. A rigid identity and a homogeneous lifestyle (essentially 
centered around regard for morality) would be encouraged.  
In contrast, education for autonomy should be focused on guiding children 
to find a way of life that they can endorse. Such an education is often advocated as a 
safeguard against impositions of parents, community or government, that can 
inhibit children’s life choices. For example, Harry Brighouse asks to consider some 
children born into a community which upholds a system of morality that might be 
quite restricting. Such communities, owing to the restrictive principles that they 
uphold, may not permit children to explore and pursue a life that corresponds to 
their fundamental needs and interests (Brighouse 2006). Because living in such 
conditions which constrains personal flourishing, Brighouse argues that an 
education for personal autonomy must instead create an opportunity to escape these 
constraints, and find a life in which one can flourish.  
Therefore, Cuypers can solve (or avoid) the paradox of educating for 
autonomy only at an unacceptable cost. Education for authenticity (and hence for 
autonomy) is conceptualized as integral to education for moral responsibility. But 
this requires imparting objective moral knowledge—or at least does not allow 
indifference to moral knowledge. Such an education would lead the person into 
particular life choices, as opposed to leaving her free to find her own way of life. At 
the very least, it is not clear it is still worth calling this form of education “educating 
for autonomy.” 
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2.6 Taking stock  
In the previous chapter, we saw that Peters attempts to solve the problem he 
himself set up by pointing out that educational methods based on habituation can 
foster what he calls active habits. But this, at best, only solves one half of the 
paradox: active habits may promote competency conditions for autonomy, but not 
authenticity conditions. How can the habits themselves be authentic? In this 
chapter, we saw that Noggle suggests that authenticity needs no special ab initio 
requirement. Authenticity can be the result of internally motivated changes in one’s 
attitudes, and in any case the very initial core attitudes must be declared to be 
authentic. But Noggle’s account is too loose: by granting authenticity to any initial 
set of core attitudes, it ends up according authenticity to agents and choices that are 
not, in fact, authentic. Finally, Cuypers makes a connection between authenticity 
(and thus autonomy) and the moral responsibility of the adult-to-be. While it might 
seem that this provides an easy solution to the paradox, we saw that Cuypers’s 
account is too strict: by tying educating for autonomy to educating for moral 
responsibility, the result is an education that necessarily privileges moral 
development (in particular, moral knowledge), and does not leave sufficient room 
for free development of the individual, which is what intuitively educating for 
autonomy should do.  
 In the next chapter, similar to Cuypers I will consider authenticity in a 
forward-looking manner. However, instead of viewing authenticity relative to future 
moral responsibility, I will suggest that education should view authenticity relative 
to the child’s right to an open future. 
 
 
  
 
23 
 
Chapter 3  
 An improved forward-looking account  
3.1 Introduction 
We now know what a good solution to the paradox of educating for autonomy 
must look like: 1) it must show how authentic attitudes (beliefs, desires, values, 
habits etc.) can be the result of education—competency is not enough; 2) it must not 
be too loose to consider inauthentic attitudes that restrict the psychological choices 
of the person as authentic; 3) it must not be too strict to encourage a homogeneous 
character, that goes against the educating for autonomy. 
In this chapter I will argue that, instead of considering authenticity relative 
to the future moral responsibility, as Cuypers did, we should consider authenticity 
relative to the children’s right to an open future. This way, education will satisfy all 
the conditions set above, and provide a solution to the paradox.  
3.2 An improved forward-looking account of educating for autonomy 
The intuitive thought behind my solution is that education can promote 
autonomy only if education can respect, and promote, the child’s right to an open 
future.  
The argument for the child’s right to an open future has originally been 
developed by Joel Feinberg (Feinberg 1992). According to Feinberg, a common 
category of rights that both applies to adults and children, that is, “A-C rights”, are 
rights not to be mistreated. Besides the common category, he distinguishes among 
rights that only belong to adults (“A rights”), such as legal rights and right to act 
autonomously; and another type of rights that are generally characteristic of 
children (“C rights”), but can also be possessed by adults in unusual circumstances. 
C rights have two subclasses. The first subclass of “C rights” is based on a child's 
dependence upon adults to sustain basic and instrumental goods of life. The second 
subclass of “C rights” are rights that look like adult autonomy rights, which Feinberg 
calls “rights-in-trust”. He writes about child’s “rights-in-trust” as follows: 
When sophisticated autonomy rights are attributed to children who are clearly not yet capable 
of exercising them, their names refer to rights that are to be saved for the child until he is an 
adult, but which can be violated ‘in advance’, so to speak, before the child is even in a position 
to exercise them. The violating conduct guarantees now that when the child is an autonomous 
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adult, certain key options will already be closed to him. His right while he is still a child is to 
have these future options kept open until he is a fully formed, self-determining adult capable 
of deciding among them (Feinberg 1992 pp. 76–7). 
“Rights-in-trust”, which Feinberg sums up as a single “right to an open 
future”, are rights that protect the key future options of the child (Feinberg 1992 p. 
77). This right encompasses a broad spectrum of the child’s life in a forward-looking 
manner, and puts some limits on “A rights”, especially when these concern the 
sphere of education. For example, one could argue that, in liberal states, parents’ 
autonomy rights (“A rights”) allow them to influence their children’s beliefs and 
attitudes with activities like going to church on Sundays, or not consuming meat for 
moral reasons (Brighouse & Swift 2006; Narveson 2002). Or, in schools, educators 
are normally free to praise and promote certain good character traits, influencing 
children to internalise such values. From “the child’s right to an open future” point 
of view, such adults’ activities of shaping children’s values and attitudes are 
permissible, but only as long as they do not preclude the child’s future autonomy, 
i.e. do not undermine the child’s right to an open future. 
It is not easy to find out whether a child’s right to an open future is violated 
in particular cases. But we can see that the examples of oppressed Olivia and Emile 
from chapter 2 are cases of violations of this right. At least partly as a result of her 
education, Olivia has no other future options but to live a submissive life. At least 
partly as a result of his education (which formed him to become a moral saint), some 
key options for Emile have been closed off, in particular, the option to spare some 
space for non-moral projects. These are therefore cases where inauthenticity (and 
consequently lack of autonomy) is the result of an education which violated the 
child’s right to an open future.  
My proposal then is to make the following argument:  
1) the question whether education can promote authenticity is tied together 
with the question whether education can promote, or at least respect, a child’s 
right to an open future: if the latter right is ensured, then, as educators, we 
need not worry about authenticity as a separate matter;  
2) certain types of education (remember, both informal and formal) can ensure 
the child’s right to an open future;  
3) therefore, certain types of education can promote authenticity.  
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If the argument is correct, the paradox of educating for autonomy is overcomed, 
because now we can see how authenticity conditions for autonomy can be secured 
by education.  
 It can be seen how my proposal is similar to Cuypers’s, not only because it 
invites thinking of authenticity in forward-looking terms—the question is whether 
the child will have an open future—but also because it avoids relying on a specific 
analysis of authenticity. Authenticity is put into relation with the idea of an open 
future, but I am not proposing a theory of authenticity. All I am saying is that, 
whatever authenticity is, a person with an open future will also be a person whose 
choices can be authentic. By granting a person with an open future, you also grant 
her the possibility (at least) to be authentic. I stress that this is an advantage, not a 
disadvantage, of my proposal: it makes it a simpler, and thus stronger proposal, 
because it avoids commitment to any controversial ideas about authenticity.  
I will now briefly defend premise 1 and premise 2 of my argument. Premise 1 
can be defended by looking again at the shortcoming in Cuypers’s solution based on 
future moral responsibility. The problem with Cuypers’s solution was that, when the 
focus of educating for authenticity has to include imparting moral knowledge on the 
child, the danger is that we form only a particular kind of agent (an agent who lives 
by moral rules), and thus undermine her freedom to explore different paths, which 
should be at the centre of the project of promoting autonomy. But when we focus 
instead on securing the child’s right to an open future, this danger is avoided, and 
the authenticity is preserved. By definition, keeping as many options as possible 
open for the adult she will become is exactly what this right demands. And keeping 
open as many options as possible will put the agent in a position to make authentic 
choices. As educators guided by the child’s right to an open future, we will keep an 
eye on reducing possible sources of inauthenticity, most importantly by paying close 
attention to how our own practices as parents or teachers may lead the child to 
inauthentic choices later in life.  
Of course, securing the right to an open future does not guarantee that the 
child will make, as an adult, authentic choices. Whether this is so will depend on 
many other variables that are not under the control of educators. But a solution to 
the paradox only requires that authenticity is not undermined by education—recall 
that the paradox was that the very process of education seemed to be incompatible 
with the ideal of authenticity.  
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Premise 2 says that certain types of education (whether informal or formal) 
can ensure the child’s right to an open future. This premise is relatively easy to 
defend. Suppose one denies it: it is not true that certain types of education can 
ensure the child’s right to an open future. In other words, suppose that no type of 
education could ensure a right to an open future. Now, this would not necessarily 
mean the collapse of such a right. In principle there are other agencies or 
institutions, different from educational ones, that could promote such a right. 
Health institutions for example have a role to play here: granting a child the best 
health conditions is part of ensuring that key options in her future are not closed off. 
However, the idea that neither informal nor formal educational institutions are able 
to even contribute something towards the right to an open future of the child seems 
very hard to believe. As illustrated before, educators and care-takers intuitively seem 
to be the main actors called upon to make sure that this right is honoured. Granting 
the existence of a child’s right to an open future, while denying that educators can 
do anything to promote that right, would be as odd as granting that there is a right 
to vote, while denying that any political system whatsoever is able to enact that 
right.  
What is more, if premise 2 were false, this would mean that children spend 
the near entirety of their childhood in the company of, and under the guidance of, 
people (parents, family, teachers) who can do nothing to positively contribute 
towards a central right that they have. This seems very counterintuitive. In other 
words, if premise 2 were false—but it was still true that children have a right to an 
open future—one would have to completely reorganize children’s lives, so that they 
spend much more time not with educators (parents or teachers), but with people 
who can contribute towards providing them with an open future. This seems a very 
unrealistic scenario.  
Of course, establishing premise 2 does not yet tell us just which educators 
and which forms of education are the best to promote a child’s right to an open 
future. Perhaps one good candidate, at least as regards formal education, is Meira 
Levinson’s proposal of “detached schools” (Levinson 1999). Detached schools follow 
roughly a liberal paradigm, whereby schools have the explicit role of limiting the 
influence of parents and society on children, and instead favour the autonomy of the 
child. But other types of school might also work well. It is not the aim of this work 
to investigate this question, which I leave for future reflection.  
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Having defended premise 1 and 2, the argument presented above then seems 
to be correct. One way to criticize it would be to reject altogether Feinberg’s idea of 
children’s right to an open future, or its importance. One could argue, for example, 
that children are in some sense their parents’ projects, and while children do have 
some special rights against their parents (to be taken care of, to be not hurt etc.), a 
right to an open future would limit too much parents’ prerogatives (Narveson 2002). 
But it would take another work of this length to defend Feinberg’s idea from such 
criticism. Here I can do no more than rely on the intuitive appeal of the right to an 
open future, in order to use it for solving the paradox of educating for autonomy.  
3.3 Comparison with Peters, Noggle, Cuypers 
In section 3.2, I argued that by respecting and preserving the child’s right to 
an open future education can promote children’s authenticity. In this section, I will 
illustrate how my proposal overcomes the shortcomings of the solutions proposed 
by Peters, Noggle and Cuypers. The discussions in chapter 1 and 2 revealed that any 
solution to the paradox 1) should be able to explain how education can result in 
preserving the authenticity of child’s psychological elements (beliefs, desires, values 
etc.) 2) It must not be too loose to define inauthentic attitudes that hinder future 
choices of children—thus autonomy—as authentic. 3) It must not be too strict to 
encourage only one type of life as an option for an autonomous person. I will take 
these as guidelines to evaluate and showcase how my solution fulfils these criteria.  
Peters’s resolution of the paradox consisted in distinguishing between 
passive and active habits. According to Peters, active habits are actions that have a 
fair degree of open-endedness, which makes them adaptable to a given situation. 
Roughly put, when an agent acts on active habits, she is rationally aware of her 
actions. This also means that when she acts on a rule she intelligently understands 
the complexity of the rule and practices the “language” of the concept. Which in turn 
makes this rule an authentic element of her evaluative scheme (section 1.4). In 
Peters's view, development of active habits allows education to escape the paradox.  
Let’s look back at Mill’s example: as a child he acquired the habit of rational 
reflection. In Peter’s view, Mill’s education has preserved the authenticity of his 
evaluative scheme, simply because he is able to give reasons for his habits. However, 
as I have argued in 1.4, even though Mill has acquired competency, we still do not 
know why active habits are more authentic than passive habits, given that they both 
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are a result of inculcation. We still do not know how education, besides promoting 
the habit of rational reflection (competency conditions), can preserve authenticity 
of children’s evaluative scheme. Peters’s solution while revealing that the paradox 
of educating for autonomy is closely tied to the authenticity condition of autonomy, 
fails the first requirement of solving the paradox: the paradox cannot be solved 
unless we are able to explain how the education process promotes, or at least does 
not undermine, authenticity of evaluative schemes.  
In section 2.2 I agreed with Noggle that the paradox cannot be solved as long 
as we hold up to ab initio requirement of authenticity: that is, an inauthentic 
element (beliefs, desires etc.,) of the self cannot pass authenticity to another 
element. If this requirement is true, then education will always try to build 
authenticity on existing inauthentic elements of evaluative schemes. However, 
because ab initio requirement is a conceptual impossibility, we have a good reason 
to reject it.  
Noggle proposed that because there cannot be a self-creating self, and when 
a person acquires an initial self there is no previous self on top of which this initial 
self can arise then the initial self should be granted authenticity. What is more, 
because this initial self is the only self, then even if the initial self is a result of 
indoctrinative child rearing techniques, it should still be declared as authentic 
(section 2.2). However, as Olivia’s example demonstrates, harsh paternalism can 
leave a child with non-sheddable impulses that limit the psychologically genuine 
options; Olivia did not have any other choice but to satisfy her desire for 
submissiveness. This means that the paradox cannot be solved by conceiving 
authenticity in such a loose sense, and thus Noggle’s suggestion fails to fulfil second 
criterion for solving the paradox.  
Olivia’s case shows that education during childhood (formal or informal) is 
directly linked to the variety of possible choices that a child will have in the future. 
Such a link shows that a solution to the paradox of educating for autonomy lies in 
thinking about authenticity in a forward-looking manner. The solution proposed by 
Cuypers implements the notion of forward-looking authenticity, acknowledging that 
even if there is no authentic self per se, different child rearing techniques can either 
enhance (preserve) or limit the possibility of a child to be authentic in the future. 
Nevertheless, Cuypers’s account falls short of solving the paradox as it views 
authenticity of the elements of psychology relative to the future moral responsibility: 
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if a belief or desire does promote the future responsibility of the adult into whom 
the child will grow up, it is authentic.  
Cuypers defends such a position because to be a morally responsible agent 
one needs to have epistemic competency and control over one’s action which should 
stem from authentic elements of psychology (section 2.4). Hence, by preserving 
future moral responsibility, education is supposed to preserve the authenticity of a 
child. However, if having knowledge about an action’s moral significance is 
necessary for moral responsibility, according to the forward-looking account 
proposed by Cuypers, education should inculcate in children objective knowledge of 
what makes an action wrong/right. As I have argued in section 2.5, living one’s life 
as a morally responsible agent is one option for autonomous agents. However, by 
inculcating specific normative rules, education will shape children into a person 
with particular homogeneous character traits, which goes against the diversity 
needed of educating for autonomy. For this reason, Cuypers’s account, while 
satisfying the first and second criteria for the solution of the paradox, fails to fulfil 
the third criterion by being too strict.  
In comparison to these three solutions, my suggestion to view authenticity 
relative to the child’s right to an open future, an improved forward-looking account, 
is able to satisfy all three conditions needed for solving the paradox of educating for 
autonomy. While acknowledging that self-creating self is impossible and that 
authentic self can raise gradually, it is not too loose to consider inauthentic attitudes 
of initial self that inhibit future authentic choices as authenticity-preserving. For 
example, we saw that in the cases of Olivia and Edgar their future psychological 
options have been shaped and limited in such a way that they are not able to live any 
other life. If Olivia’s and Edgar's education has preserved their future choices, they 
would have had a chance to act otherwise. For this reason, an improved forward-
looking account meets the second requirement.  
Improved forward-looking account also is not as strict as one proposed by 
Cuypers. Similar to Cuypers’s solution, it recognises that certain values or habits 
while being worthy aims, like in the example of Emile, can hinder future autonomy 
of children. The major shortcoming of Cuypers’s account, as it was mentioned above, 
is that it promotes a rigid identity and a homogeneous character (mainly moral one), 
which is too strict and counterintuitive from educating for autonomy point of view. 
In contrast, authenticity when viewed in relation to a child's right to an open future 
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does not impose a particular lifestyle as an only option. The advantage of a forward-
looking account is that it aims at facilitating children with value, belief or habits that 
will promote/preserve their future choices, granting children the possibility of being 
authentic. As a result, an improved forward-looking account satisfies the third 
condition to solve the paradox.  
 Finally, I show in section 3.2 that some education (formal or informal) can 
preserve the child’s right to an open future. This in turn, will preserve the child’s 
chances for authentic, therefore, an autonomous, life. This being the case, it can be 
concluded that a) education does not always inhibit the authenticity of a child’s 
elements of psychology, and b) because it can promote the child’s right to an open 
future it can also promote the child’s authenticity. By satisfying all three criteria, an 
improved forward-looking account, i.e. the solution I have proposed in this chapter, 
solves the paradox of educating for autonomy.  
3.4 One objection and my reply 
One objection to my proposal might be that it sets too strict limits to the ways 
a child can be educated or even parented. It can be claimed that educators and 
parents will be lost in trying to justify why their techniques do not harm the future 
authenticity, and therefore autonomy, of children.  
However, this should not be a problem. My account can acknowledge that 
children need external influences to acquire beliefs, desire, values in order to 
develop into something worth calling a self. On my account, external influence does 
not per se undermine authenticity, because external influences do not necessarily 
undermine an “open future”. In fact, without (the right type of) external influences 
a child is very likely to have many key options closed off. At the same time, my 
account does require attention to the methods one uses in education. In particular, 
an education which has the effect of instilling preferences that are irresistible (“non-
sheddable”, as defined before), or beliefs and habits that are unchangeable, will 
violate the right to an open future, because it will not promote authenticity. What 
this means in practice is that a parent or a teacher would be free to share their 
reasons why their choice of life, culture, or religion is in their opinion a good one. 
What these adults will have to avoid is forcing the child to live the same way, to 
internalise the same traditions, or to follow the same religious services, as they 
themselves do. This way, the bond between educators and the child will be intact, 
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and the child will grow up in an environment that supports autonomy and preserves 
her future authenticity. However, like I said above, I leave the discussion of concrete 
educational methods and practices for another occasion.
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I presented the paradox of educating for autonomy, and argued 
that it can be solved by conceiving authenticity in a forward-looking manner. That 
is, by adopting an educational system that is able to preserve/promote the child’s 
right to an open future, the children’s authenticity will be preserved, and thus, in 
turn, their autonomy.  
In the first chapter, I introduced the concept of autonomy and discussed how 
it relates to the paradox of educating for autonomy. My interpretation of the paradox 
was inspired by Richard Peters’s discussion of the paradox of moral education, the 
solution of which revealed–while satisfying one of the two conditions, the 
competency–the paradox prevails due to the authenticity conditions of autonomy; 
and that it can only be solved if education can preserve/promote authenticity of the 
child’s evaluative scheme. 
In the second chapter, turning to Robert Noggle’s and Stefaan Cuypers’s 
solutions of the paradox, I argued firstly that Noggle’s proposal is too loose because 
it views any type of initial self as authentic. Then, I considered Cuypers’s suggestion 
that child’s evaluative scheme is authentic as long as the attitudes inculcated during 
the childhood are able to preserve/promote the moral responsibility of the child as 
an adult. As moral responsibility has authenticity and control requirements, 
Cuypers argued that the paradox of educating for autonomy will be also solved. But 
this solution is too strict since it risks promoting moral agency as the only option for 
autonomous life.  
In the third chapter I argued that authenticity considered relative to the 
child’s right to an open future is able to satisfy all of the three requirements 
mentioned in section 3.3 and thus, solve the paradox of educating for autonomy. I 
claimed that an education that is able to preserve and promote an open future with 
as many options as possible for the child to choose from and design her own life 
with, will be able to preserve her authenticity. Such an education, by preserving 
authenticity, can also promote autonomy. Thus, the paradox of educating for 
autonomy is solved. 
In this thesis, I did not consider the implications of my solution for 
pedagogical studies and curriculum design. I also did not touch on which conception 
of autonomy should guide the process of education. Even though I have avoided 
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basing my solution on any particular theory of authenticity, autonomy or type of 
education, whatever the outcome of these relevant discussions be, it will not affect 
the solution that I have posited in this thesis. 
By showcasing that education can preserve the future freedom and 
authenticity of children, my thesis justifies discussions of autonomy that consider 
autonomy an important aim of education. Also, because it shows how external 
influences (like family values) are necessary for the development of an identity, and 
what type of external influences (limiting a child's future options) can hinder future 
autonomy, my thesis also can contribute to solving the conflict between parental 
rights to act autonomously and the child’s future autonomy.  
 
34 
 
 
Abstract  
This thesis explores the paradox of educating for autonomy. I state the underlying 
problem which is in an apparent incompatibility between education–a process of 
inculcation that shapes children’s values, beliefs, desires, etc., while bypassing their 
rationality–and the desired end of guiding children to become autonomous persons. 
I provide an outline of the possible solutions proposed by Richard Peters, Robert 
Noggle, and Stefaan Cuypers, and point out their deficiencies. Ultimately, I suggest 
a forward-looking solution, which considers the authenticity of children’s attitudes 
(values, beliefs etc.,) in relation to the child’s right to an open future.   
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